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TOWARDS GOOD GOVERNANCE IN UPGRADING DEPRIVED AREAS: AN APPROACH TO EMPOWER PARTICIPATORY MANAGEMENT IN EGYPT

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TOWARDS GOOD GOVERNANCE IN UPGRADING DEPRIVED AREAS: AN APPROACH TO EMPOWER PARTICIPATORY MANAGEMENT IN EGYPT

Abstract

Slums are a problem facing the whole world as a result of poor housing policies and rapid urbanization. Previous Egyptian housing policies created the problem of slums from scratch. The Egyptian government tries to eliminate slums with centralized policies, but it does not succeed. Egypt recently recognized the need to participate in slum upgrading through community partnership. Previous upgrading policies did not perform as required due to their distance from a participatory and fair representation of stakeholders. The independent participatory intermediary model achieves great results if it has decentralized decision-making. The problem is the relation between the governing parties in Egypt. The gap between them causes resolutions haphazard because of non-participation in decision-making. As a result, the objectives are not achieved as hoped in upgrading slums. This paper aims to draw a framework between governance parties to achieve the objectives through literature reviews and the availability of applying it in Egypt.

Keywords

Participatory, good governance, decentralization, deprived areas, slums

1. INTRODUCTION

Slums are a major problem in developing countries. It is a natural consequence of rapid urbanization. It indicates the inability of Governments to meet social changes in providing suitable housing for the poor. It is a solution that the poor present to themselves because of bureaucracy and failed housing policies from governments and the greed of the private sector (Khalifa, 2015).

Governments are shifting their policies from centralized to decentralized to upgrade slums. Centralization as a top-down strategy has many disadvantages such as corruption, maladministration, lack of transparency, and marginalize poor classes. New liberalism introduces new concepts such as decentralization, participatory governance, good governance, and using a participatory approach to deliver services and basic infrastructure (Das & Takahashi, 2009). The intermediary that partners the government to serve residents leads to the best results that can be built upon (Bremer & Bhuiyan, 2014).

2. CAUSES AND UPGRADING STRATEGIES WITHIN EGYPTIAN CONTEXT

Slums are widespread in several regions in Egypt. Greater Cairo is the most affected by this phenomenon by 60% of its population. Mostly, slums are located around formal settlements. Informal constructing is either on private agricultural lands or desert lands owned by the government (Eid, Khalifa, & Azouz, 2014). Agricultural lands are affected by 80% of the total informal settlements, while government lands by 15% only. Egypt will lose around half of the agricultural land because the law does not apply to the offenders (Khalifa, 2015). In the beginning, Governments do not recognize slums, but later they try to merge it with the formal settlements after the situations getting worse. Then, they give the green light to invest in the infrastructure. As a result, they may cooperate with society in multiple ways to deliver services in these regions (Bremer & Bhuiyan, 2014).

Slum-dwellers suffer from the availability of basic services, infrastructures, resources as a result of the government's continued neglect. Residents also struggle to provide a livelihood caused by learning impairments and low job skills (Eid, Khalifa, & Azouz, 2014). Supporting infrastructure is an obstacle because of the size of slums, finance, and the difficulty of installation in hazardous areas (Bremer & Bhuiyan, 2014).

2.1 Reasons for appearing

The slums in Egypt have emerged as a response to political changes due to their economic and housing strategies. The government and private sector provided suitable houses before 1952. President Gamal Abdel Nasser issued laws supporting social justice in favor of tenants against landlords. This changed the owners' policies to convert to sale instead of leasing in the old and new properties. These policies created the housing crisis, so the poor resorted to informal urbanization. Abdel Nasser's economic policies provided job opportunities by building factories on the outskirts of cities. This strategy encouraged Internal migration from rural to urban areas (Khalifa, 2015).

The Egyptian real estate market was affected by the war with Israel from 1967 to 1973. The government channeled funds to the military backing instead of urban development. After the war, President Sadat turned to the Open-Door Economic Policy as a part of the economic liberalism. The public sector has channeled its efforts to build low-income housing while the private sector builds housing for the middle and high classes. Rental houses did not meet the high demand for housing besides the high price of what available. Rental prices were higher than the liveability of poor residents. On the other hand, The Egyptian expatriate laborers in the Gulf countries invested their money in the informal buildings instead of planned areas (Khalifa, 2015).

The emergence of new slums was stopped during the President Mubarak period. However, the problem of the old slums has not been resolved. On the other hand, the public sector activity declined in low-income housing providing. As a result, the private sector dominated the formal and informal real estate market (Khalifa, 2015). During the 25 Jan revolution following Mubarak, the informal settlements increased as a result of political instability, law enforcement, and power struggle (Bremer & Bhuiyan, 2014). Slum-dwellers calls increased to pressure the government to recognize them and meet their demands. The current decision-makers try to reform the previous policies through new development programs (Khalifa, 2015).




Fig. 1 Slums growth curve in Egypt

Reference: Analysis by the researcher based on the reason for appearing references

2.2 Egyptian Upgrading strategies

The government recently resorted to upgrading slums rather than demolishing it. This action was encouraged by the World Bank project in 1977. This project aimed to upgrade existing areas and legalize their conditions, in addition to building new settlements. These government initiatives were individual and dependent on the government's effort alone to be repeatable (El-Sheikh, 2002). The Hai Al-Salam upgrade project is participation between Ismailia Governorate and Britain's Overseas development, administration as a sponsor, and consultant partner. This project was designed to self-finance from the start in 1978. This project aimed to develop existing areas and build new ones. The governor assigned a local committee to manage the project with financial and administrative decentralization powers to allocate the lands and make decisions. The members of this committee were initially appointed according to strict conditions, but then people were added with more flexible requirements. The governorate assigned a committee to each region, and each committee was responsible for spending and completing the work, with the accountability of the governor (El-Sheikh, 2002). The objectives of the project are to regulate land tenure and recover the price of some of them by selling some land to residents and providing community services and basic infrastructure. The British agency provided initial funding, established an office for the project, and sponsored advertisements for the project, land leveling, and surveying. The project relied on supporting the governor and the willingness of the beneficiaries of new housing to return to the promotion in addition to participating in setting priorities. The project succeeded in attracting investments and converting the region from red brick buildings without infrastructures to modern buildings that are supplied by the services (El-Sheikh, 2002). Egyptian slums upgrading projects were launched seriously since the nineties, after years of neglecting, to provide basic infrastructures such as electricity, water, sanitation facilities, and street paving as a first stage from 1994 to 2004. The government allocated a fund for slums upgrading beside a field survey to document these areas. The first stage supplied 25% only of the objective regions with infrastructure due to non-participation of stakeholders in planning, implementation, and decision-making besides the Government's inability to legalize land acquisition (Khalifa, 2015). The first stage did not aim to improve the social and economic efficiency of slum dwellers. In the second stage, the Informal Settlement Development Facility was established in 2008. It is under the management of the Egyptian Cabinet. This facility sets terms that differentiate between "unplanned areas" and "unsafe areas". It aims to involve the private sector in the upgrading process, clearing the hazardous area to be replaced in another formal area, eliminating risks, and paying financial compensation to the affected families. In parallel, the government's policy of establishing new cities in the desert began from the period of Sadat until now. New cities still prove successful in some places, but the obstacles remained in transferring residents, the high costs of the new houses and supplying was less than demanding (Khalifa, 2015). These policies are not enough to counter the rapid expansion of urbanization and population explosion, so the government understood the need to engage with other parties. President El-Sisi established the Long Live Egypt Fund to finance multidisciplinary national projects, including upgrading informal settlements. This strategy aims at relocating and renewing slums all over Egypt with new organized ones with housing, schools, hospitals, services, and places of worship Such as "Al-Asmarat" sub-district in Cairo and "Bashayer El-Khair" projects in Alexandria. These projects succeeded in achieving high efficiency and merging with the surrounding urban environment (Magdi, S. A., 2018; Abd El Monem, N., 2017).

3. ACTIVATING PARTICIPATORY IN EGYPT

The Egyptian government realizes the importance of participatory with the private sector, NGOs, and society to launch slum upgrading projects and attract new funding (Khalifa, 2015). The launch of participatory upgrading projects between two or more parties was not new. Egypt knows well the importance of participation in previous upgrading projects such as *Manshiet Nasser*, *Darb Al-Ahmar*, *Bulaq Al-Dakrur* region, and others. The Egyptian government tries to apply the World Bank recommendations to empower the community and public-private partnership (Shehayeb & Abdelhalim, 2012).

3.1 Practices of participation in Egypt

“*Gameyet El-Mostaqbal*” is an NGO established by the Egyptian first lady Suzan Mubarak. She launched the "Shelter for all" slogan to promote "The Future Housing Project", which was built by this NGO. Without the price of the land, this project cost 2.1 billion pounds. This organization is considered a mixture of stakeholders. It was managed by leaders from the private sector. These businessmen specializing in construction to build 70 thousand residential units. The area of one unit is 63 square meters to be replicated in 15 new cities. The projects of this organization received great governmental support and prizes. Whereas, in the year 2000, the project won the Arab Council of Ministers Award for Housing and Reconstruction (Khalifa, 2015).

Participatory Development Program in Urban Areas (PDP) is a project in partnership between the Egyptian and German governments to upgrade slums of Greater Cairo. This project was a partnership with the German Ministry of International Cooperation, local popular councils, local leaders, and a group of youth and volunteer women. This project was a model of cooperation in decision-making (Shehayeb & Abdelhalim, 2012).

This project aims to support partnerships between local government and civil society organizations to raise the standard of living and deliver services. It also aims to demonstrate that participation can operate efficiently. This project started upgrading in two places: *Manshiet Nasser* and *Boulaq el Dakrour* through the upgrade of infrastructure and basic facilities (Khalifa, 2015). The upgrading project was launched within 7 neighborhoods of the Bulaq Dakrur district in Egypt. Overall, the experiment was successful at the levels of needs provision while encountering challenges in budget management, full empowerment, and potential for replication. Successful participation was facilitated by neighborhood committees, but this project was only to test the effectiveness of the partnership and not for radical change or making a difference (Shehayeb & Abdelhalim, 2012). In *Al-Asmarat* sub-district, for example, which was completed in 2016, the private sector cooperated through factories within this neighborhood to upgrade the standard of living, in addition to the efforts of civil society organizations in financial aid, improving their skills and awareness, in addition to government administration of schools, hospitals and shops, and providing subsidized services (Ashmawy, I.K.I.M, 2020).

Participation between parties in *Bashayer Al-Khair* projects appears in the governorate's provision of land, the armed forces' supervision of implementation, and businessmen volunteering to finance public and residential buildings and elect population leaders for the poor to link with these parties (Abd El Monem, N.,2017). Despite the success of this strategy now, one of the weaknesses that people feel is the lack of participation with other parties in decision-making, the lack of consultation or the involvement of all stakeholders, and the uniqueness of the armed forces and the political leadership in a centralized form (Oxford Analytica, 2019).

The lack of a specific and clear framework that makes the change in the name of the president, his ideology, or the lack of interest in the future for any circumstance, a risk that leads to the recurrence of the problem again because the solutions are not resistant to risks.

Table 1. Summary of previous Egyptian upgrading practices

Model	Slum dweller	Government	Private sector	NGOs
Hai Al Salam	×	✓	×	×
	Advantages		Disadvantages	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Merging investment thinking with upgrading Independent committees 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Not participating in decision-making Individual work 	
<i>Gameyet El-Mostaqbal</i>	×	✓		
	Advantages		Disadvantages	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A mixture of government with businessmen and non-governmental organizations at the same time. 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Nominally non-governmental Away from accountability and transparency Residents do not participate in decision-making. 	
PDP	×	✓	×	✓
	Advantages		Disadvantages	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Successful in upgrade and infrastructure support 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Don't share decision-making with residents Not interested in the private sector and raising the standard of living of the population. Needs government support Just to experiment and hard to repeat 	
<i>Al-Asmarat sub-district and Bashayer El-Khair projects</i>	×	✓	✓	✓
	Advantages		Disadvantages	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Supervision from the armed forces Great results and high-quality performance The private sector is involved in financing and implementation Can be repeated 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Does not involve any party in decision-making, as an example of centralization Imbalance of power between the parties It depends on the government's desire only Threatened not to be repeated if the political ideology or economic vision changes Partial involvement of NGOs 	

3.2 Obstacle against participatory in Egypt

Successful participation requires decentralization. The conflict with bureaucracy, laws, and regulations do not serve the partnership between the parties to achieve good governance. The political instability affects the continuity of upgrading strategies and decision-making. That forces decision-makers to move to centralization as a radical and immediate solution (El-Sheikh, 2002). The current bureaucracy of the Egyptian government does not help partnerships with NGOs or Community-Based Organizations (CBOs) (Bremer & Bhuiyan, 2014). The Egyptian government should develop a formal framework for the recognition of self-organized organizations and participatory committees under a legal mechanism (Bremer & Bhuiyan, 2014). Till now, Egypt does not decentralize governance at the decision-making level between the government and the governors despite this is illegal (Shehayeb & Abdelhalim, 2012). In theory, Egyptian laws facilitate bottom-up participation, but when implemented the sense of the gap increases between theory and practice. This deficiency appears in sharing the opinions of residents that serve their interests, but their participation during planning and decision-making is lacking. The decisions are also not related due to administrative structural problems (Afify, A. M. N., 2011). The heterogeneity between the parties becomes clear, according to their true goals for participation. The Egyptian government's calls for the partnership are temporary and ineffective. The private sector is passionate about the partnership owing to its owners' ambitions of social image and tax reduction (Shehayeb & Abdelhalim, 2012). NGOs are the unofficial face of political leaders as a result of international pressure to establish NGOs. Despite this, the influence of NGOs is greater than the local popular councils because of interacting with society through charity activities. On the other hand, residents feel marginalized in decision-making (Shehayeb & Abdelhalim, 2012). This does not negate that the Egyptian personality does not bear responsibility. Indifference is a stumbling block to effective participation to achieve real change. All parties have the distress of participation. They prefer to escape by blaming organizing, structuring, experience, and finance. The government is interested in the immediate solution because of the lack of community organization and serious leadership willing to change. Stakeholders are not prevailing the public interest over the Individual demands (El-Sheikh, 2002).

4. PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE LITERATURE REVIEWS IN DEPRIVED AREAS UPGRADING

This part demonstrates some of the models, previous experiences, and theories for managing urban governance, development, and partnership among stakeholders in multiple countries such as India, Zimbabwe, and Thailand. The selection of these previous experiences because of the advantages and disadvantages of the experience of sharing decision-making with other governance parties for each model and a simulation of problems, manipulations, and defects that may occur (Table 2). Selection of SNP Ahmedabad model as a result of the inclusion of the model successes and errors that have been fixed to become an ideal model to be followed in its application. Harare model is a model of democracy, participation, and the distribution of roles with official documents. Bangkok model is chosen because it expresses how the committees are chosen and represented fairly, and it explains the methods of cheating that can spoil the idealism of the system.

4.1 The Slum Networking Project (SNP) of Ahmedabad

In 1995, Government representatives participated with partners from the private sector, NGOs, and slum dwellers in the SNP project participatory committee. This committee appointed urban developers to put an upgrading plan. The duties were distributed among all parties. The project's goal was to improve basic infrastructure. The project was fully funded locally, including families. Opinions were mixed in this project, some opinions considered it a failure at the beginning, but after replicating the experiment, people turned to its successes. The failure of infrastructure upgrading in some areas was because of bad managing the financial gains (Das & Takahashi, 2009).

The spirit of solidarity helped in the allocation of responsibilities. The government-guaranteed the land tenure to residents for ten years, until families felt ownership of the place. The municipality's role was in designing and planning the project. The CBOs executed the upgrading plans, but they were not involved during the planning process. They cooperated with NGOs to document sites, remove obstacles, monitor the construction process, implement infrastructure works. The major task of NGOs was helping residents to accept the project. Cooperation between the private sector and the government was very weak. The private sector did not provide employment opportunities and educational services. The private sector withdrew from the project because of conflicts and disputes. This is one of the disadvantages of this experience due to maladministration (Das & Takahashi, 2009).

The previous experience of SNP helped in the following experiments. Memorandum of understanding signed between all parties to determine the role of each stakeholder formally. The municipality required that families must organize themselves to establish at least one formally elected community association to represent 200 families for each. Each association included between 9 and 12 executive members in addition to a general member with ensuring women's equitable representation. This model was repeated in every deprived area. They are also connected by an information linkage to support participatory experiences and solutions. The major task of associations is to manage quality, collect information, remove obstacles, and mobilize individuals. These associations took over the management of the place after the upgrading project was completed. The government required that only one NGO participate in each project. This NGO has chosen by researchers as the most active organizations. The aim of this requirement that efforts are not dispersed between organizations (Das & Takahashi, 2009).

This participatory committee succeeded in reducing the costs of building infrastructure, improving water and sanitation services, and paving roads, but it failed in training the population and creating job opportunities except in only one region. NGOs' credit systems and saving habits of women helped in improving the economic situation of residents, establishing small industrial projects, and community organizations. Residents felt satisfied with lending programs by 73% of the population (Das & Takahashi, 2009).

4.2 Municipal-community partnership in Zimbabwe

In Harare, governance depends on Civil society organizations (CSOs) and government policies such as decentralization and the participation of marginalized residents in decision-making. Harare Slum upgrading program is one of the inclusive municipal governance projects in several countries. It aims to support participation between the government and community to face challenges of upgrading deprived areas. The government decided to recognize the Zimbabwe Homeless Peoples'

Federation as one of the legalization decisions. They are also required to find alternative housing before eviction if needed. This is a big decision that helps slum dwellers a lot in feeling safe. The constitutional amendments state that the homeless have the right to supply infrastructure, food, and water (Muchadenyika, 2015). The participatory committee of the upgrading program includes government, Gates Foundation, University of Zimbabwe, other local authorities, Dialogue on Shelter organization, and the Zimbabwe Homeless Peoples Federation. This committee is ruled by a memorandum of understanding that includes terms of reference of stakeholders. This participatory committee carries out numerous tasks such as census, mapping, and documenting, preparing information files that help in decision-making besides understanding the social, economic, geographical data about these areas. The committee draws annual plans, distributes roles and tasks, prepares project management reports, and coordinates with various agencies to bridge the gap between residents of deprived areas and government authorities as a regular form of an official institution. The participatory committee forms informal planning studios which include residents and the planning school at the University of Zimbabwe. These studios objectives participatory planning and produce a housing model that should satisfy all stakeholders (Muchadenyika, 2015).

This experiment recommends reviewing regulations, laws, housing policies, and planning to achieve flexibility. Bureaucracy, restrictions of urban planning standards, housing policies, and coordination between different departments are the main obstacles to this system. Residents have created new home models, a water and sewage system, paved streets, and electricity services. This experiment does not aim to upgrade the economical level of residents. It would have been better to partner with the private sector to provide employment opportunities that help residents live and pay utility bills (Muchadenyika, 2015).

4.3 Slum-dwellers organizations in Bangkok

Thai Community-Based Organizations (CBOs) spread widely during the government's evictions on land because of the sense of solidarity of the slum-dwellers. In 1969, The Bangkok Municipality initiated the creation of an official community committee, although government support for this idea was weak. These organizations demonstrated effectiveness in 1977. The National Housing Authority encouraged this idea. As a result of this encouragement, the total number of CBOs became 267 in 1989 in all the poor neighborhoods. Community organizations have made a greater effort than the National Housing Authority. The National Housing Authority modernized 132 poor communities, while NGOs upgraded 270 societies from 1978 to 1991 (LEE, 1998).

Some committees were established nominal because this is a condition for access funds and support from the government or foreign donors. These committees were established by some politicians or workers in non-governmental organizations. This committee consists of 20 members elected by the community's residents. Often the committee members are the wealthiest because the poorest of residents must seek a livelihood. These committees may be created by politicians or individuals outside this community who are not familiar with their problems, which affects the priorities of the work plan (LEE, 1998).

Society realized these illegal practices and the gap between the government and CBOs. The solution was to establish a non-governmental government agency that represents cooperation between all parties as a roundtable and participatory committee. The government established the Urban Community Development Office (UCDO) as a decentralization authority. UCDO is funded by the Thai government and under the National Housing Authority supervision. UCDO consists of representatives from the government, CBOs, NGOs, and the private sector. UCDO's role is to deliver basic services, register homes, educate residents, improve health, establish shops, build new homes, participate in funerals and credit funds, launch awareness campaigns against AIDS and drugs, organize awareness-raising campaigns for environmental preservation and campaigns for cleaning and garbage collection (LEE, 1998).

Table 2. Summary of participatory models

Model	Slum dweller	Government	Private sector	NGOs
SNP of Ahmedabad	✓	✓	✓	✓
	Advantages		Disadvantages	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Independent commission • Distribution of tasks to all parties • Clear memorandum of understanding • Independent financing mix • Land tenure security • Participatory implementation of plans • Establishing elected associations for the population • Easy to replicate in many places with the possibility of informational linking • Department of Population Associations to manage the place after the completion of the project • Sustainability, improving relationships, and learning from mistakes • The committee succeeded in training the population • Residents were satisfied • Representation of all parties to governance 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Poor management of gains • Weak cooperation between the private sector and the government • The private sector did not create job opportunities and quickly withdrew from the project • Frequent disputes if responsibilities are not defined • The committee failed to create jobs 	
Harare	✓	✓	×	✓
	Advantages		Disadvantages	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Democracy • Decentralization in decision-making, • Recognition of the homeless • Clear memorandum of understanding 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bureaucracy • The inflexibility of laws • Coordination between departments • The interest in raising the economic efficiency • No cooperation with the private sector 	
Bangkok	✓	✓	✓	✓
	Advantages		Disadvantages	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Official community committee • Election of committee members • Non-governmental government agency as a roundtable • Decentralization authority • Under government supervision and accountability • Representation of all parties to governance 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Nominal committees for the financing and popular use of politicians • The founder of the committees often does not represent the dwellers economically or socially 	

5. GOOD GOVERNANCE OF THE PARTICIPATORY COMMITTEE

Decentralization supports new policies of participatory governance through a partnership between the private sector, NGOs, residents, and government. The problems of the upgrading projects are funding, rules, and work guides between stakeholders, the government's seriousness, and clarity of the institutional framework. The participatory model will succeed by showing its ability to achieve sustainability, be a replicable model in other places, merge with the city network, be a permanent solution and be flexible to apply in different priorities (Das & Takahashi, 2009).

5.1 Redistribution of roles

The intermediary between different entities brings views together. The participatory committee must be democratic to achieve flexible management. All parties must represent and strike a balance of forces avoiding problems. The most successful form of participatory includes the redistribution of roles and power, risk-sharing, skills, resources, and market empowerment. The committee's role is to draw annual plans, prepare management reports, oversee each project, define schedules for each task, and distribute roles. This committee must have decentralized power in co-financing from all stakeholders in addition to independence in decision-making. It must have an informational linkage between other committees in different regions to take advantage of expertise in management. The plan must be participatory and agreed upon by all stakeholders without marginalizing anyone. All parties shall finance and implement the plan, in addition to signing memoranda of understanding defining the tasks and responsibilities of each party of governance. Above all, laws and regulations should allow the flexibility to set up committees, define their decentralized powers, and amend the constitution to support the poor in their right to infrastructure, housing, and water.




Fig. 2 A summary of tasks from the successful models. The work tasks of each party individually and within the participatory committee

Reference: Analysis by the researcher based on the literature reviews

Each stakeholder has individual level assignments that can be drawn from previous experiences. The government must activate land acquisition to ensure protection and a sense of ownership. The government must design the initial plans that are in line with the city's vision as a starting point for consultations with other parties. The role of the private sector in providing job opportunities for the population and advancing the region. The presence of one NGO to focus efforts that are to educate and assist families, borrow and publicize the project to educate the population on the importance of the project and other awareness campaigns, collect information and participate in implementation. The role of residents of deprived areas first, to organize themselves in official, elected, and officially recognized entities of the state. These associations assume responsibility for managing the regions after the completion of the upgrade projects. During the project planning phase, the residents must have their opinions shared and included in decision-making. The role of community organizations in quality management, business implementation, site documentation, removal of obstacles, building supervision, and other popular oversight tasks. The residents must believe in the project and its ability to change their reality. This contributes to the project achieving its goals.

5.2 Good governance in the committee policies

Table 3. Applying good governance principles to the participatory committee.

Reference: The researcher based on UN-Habitat principles

Principles	The qualities of Participatory committee
Subsidiarity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The independence of the committee to achieve decentralization to help it in decision-making and setting priorities. • Financial government support without affecting policy decisions • Provide frameworks for legal mechanisms for delegation of responsibilities • Support through constitutional legislation for the roles of the participatory committee and the creation of community associations and civil society to facilitate government response and recognition.

Sustainability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Designing development strategies compatible with all stakeholders and satisfying all parties • Presenting an agenda and managing resources currently without affecting the future. • Merging between the strategy of upgrading the region and reducing poverty in parallel with its relationship to planning the local development of the city • Consider the environmental, cultural, and historical impact • Promoting economic activity through participation • Use appropriate technologies
Civic engagement and citizenship	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Democracy in consultation and decision-making to serve all stakeholders • Encouraging the periodic election of the associations of the community committees • Promote the active participation of civil society through legal frameworks • Promote responsibility among slum residents through hearings, seminars, open meetings, and referendums
Transparency and Accountability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Citizens discuss financial matters • Transparency in bidding processes and enhancing accountability • Financial review and public discussion • Periodically test the integrity of members and set regulations for accountability • Encouraging ethical to serve citizens through rewards • Regular disclosure of the members' wealth • Regular change of members, whether by appointment or election • Create a section for complaints and suggestions • Providing information to citizens and all agencies
Equity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Equal sharing of responsibilities • Fair distribution of resources, finances, and assets • Plural representation in decision-making, whether men, women, the elderly, youth, minorities and the handicapped
Security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Create awareness campaigns about disaster risks and others to reduce crime • Halting evacuation campaigns and establishing a legal form of land tenure • Providing job opportunities and training and educational courses to raise the level of the population in cooperation with all parties • Providing mechanisms to achieve security in the region by establishing security points • Coordination to move people from dangerous areas • Establishing an emergency system in coordination with the municipal administrations
Efficiency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strengthening partnership with the private sector and civil society • Development of the provision of goods and services through contracts of administration and fair payment policy for infrastructure and municipal services • Participatory planning and management and raising the effectiveness of local revenues • Eliminate financing obstacles and legal frameworks to encourage investment • Adopting specific plans and goals for providing public services • Attract volunteers and encourage their admission

The participatory committee must be subject to accountability and transparency from an oversight body to ensure effective project management. The lack of accountability causes financial and administrative corruption (Bremer & Bhuiyan, 2014). Transparency is achieved through the active participation of all residents and the empowerment of women in decision-making. The government's main role in accountability and supervision appears. The threats represent chaos, unequal powers, maladministration, and conflicts between parties (Das & Takahashi, 2009). Subsidiarity, sustainability, civic engagement and citizenship, transparency and accountability, equity, security, and efficiency are the Good governance basic principles by which to ensure successful management (UN-HABITAT, 2010). By applying these principles to the participatory committee, success in achieving sustainability can be ensured., as indicated in Table 3.

6. THE POSSIBILITY OF PARTICIPATORY COMMITTEE IN EGYPT

The participation model is what legally lacks Egypt and applies the principles of governance, full independence, and community participation. The lack of confidence among the residents of the disadvantaged regions and the government needs too long treatment and great efforts, but it must be overcome by lack of marginalization and active participation.

6.1 Lessons from previous

Upgrading strategies are affected by changing political leaders or economic visions that cause instability and damage that increase the problem. Therefore, the participatory committee must be completely independent of the government. It is essential to involve and satisfy all stakeholders, ensure the balance of powers within the committee, and achieve democracy.

Lessons can be extracted from the previous upgrading projects (table 1). In all cases, the initiative was by the government alone, either directly or indirectly, with weak and often unaffected participation by stakeholders and in support of the central strategic as a one-player game. The project of Hai Al-Salam lacked pluralism and the participation of all parties in addition to marginalizing the population in planning and implementation, but decentralization was applied in a good way by granting powers to the committee. The project did not focus on raising the economic, health, and educational levels of the residents of the regions. This project can be repeated, but it depends on the governor's seriousness in questioning, granting powers to the committee. Defining an organizational structure, applying the principles of good governance, and permanently launching upgrading projects. Although the PDP project continues to date, it can be described as a non-autonomous government agency that does not have decentralized power and lacks self-financing policies in projects, unlike the Hai Al-Salam project that applied decentralization and self-financing.

"*Gameyet El-Mostaqbal*" is a blurred mixture that combines the characteristics of NGOs, the private sector, and government institutions simultaneously. An unspecified policy entity and unclear if its goals are to achieve profits, political direction, real aid, or a fictitious entity only to silence pressure from world public opinion to engage NGOs. Current projects for upgrading, such as *Al-Asmarat* and *Bashayer al-Khair*, lack the participation with the rest of the parties of governance in the planning and decision-making stage, and the participation in implementation with greater effectiveness and equality between the parties and the balance of power. Time threatens the continuity of this achievement. A participatory formula must be developed through a unified committee that connects all parties and enjoys full financial and administrative independence with the need to achieve the principles of good governance to ensure its success.

6.2 Recommendations to apply participation

To achieve the optimal form of participation in Egypt, several steps must be achieved, such as:

- The decentralized powers of the governors must be applied.
- Law amendments to achieve planning flexibility and building policies that guarantee the right of the poor to affordable infrastructure and housing.
- The government must enable residents to acquire land and stop evictions.
- Ensure the formation of independent financial and administrative participatory committees that include all stakeholders in a manner that guarantees pluralism, democracy, and the balance of powers.
- Leaders and residents must abandon indifference and passivity in taking responsibility.
- The committee's responsibility is to upgrade the economic, social, and service levels of deprived areas, and not only be limited to infrastructure.
- Signing memoranda of understanding defining the tasks and responsibilities of all parties.
- Encourage the establishment of community-based organizations to legalize slum areas and ensure participation in developing plans.
- After the projects are completed, the CBOs will manage them.

7. CONCLUSIONS

Egyptian housing policies and political and economic instability have led to the growth of informal urbanization. Recently, Egypt realized the importance of participation in slum upgrading and decision-making. Egypt's solutions through centralization have not succeeded in solving the problem. The participatory committee can fill the gap between the government and the slum dwellers. The committee must be subject to accountability by regulatory authorities, and good governance principles must be applied to ensure a sustainable, balanced, and reproducible performance in other locations. Egyptian laws must be reviewed to achieve decentralization on the ground and empower governors from their powers. The law must stipulate the rules for establishing these participatory committees so that they can be replicated in several regions and to continue their work without obstacles, political or economic changes. It must ensure the establishment of associations of slum dwellers legally and with serious elections, in addition to establishing a legal framework for independent participatory committees so that the experiment can be repeated without risk. Establishing a participatory committee for each upgrading project that is characterized by independence in decision-making and funding, and contains fair and balanced representation from all parties to governance. The specialization of the committee is to set plans that satisfy

stakeholders, determine priorities and mechanisms for their implementation, distribute fair roles among the parties, and follow up on the completion of work periodically. These committees are linked with each other by databases and contacts to benefit from experiences.

The government is obligated to legalize lands, provide cash support, logistical services, and coordinate its strategic plans with the promotion plans set by the committee. The need for government to supervise the committee, follow up on the implementation of work, and hold the committee accountable for its performance. Slum-dwellers are the most important stakeholders, so they must participate in planning and implementation so that they feel that they own the project and maintain it in the future after the end of the project. The private sector has a financing role and provides job opportunities to raise the level of the economic population and implement the strategic visions of the state. Non-governmental organizations have a supportive, executing, awareness-raising, guiding, and service role, and providing statistical and documentary services. All stakeholders must be linked to memoranda of understanding to define terms of reference and regulations for the application of all principles of good governance to ensure that the system is not corrupt, sustainable, and permanently replicated.

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